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We deal with a system of prisoner’s dilemma players undergoing continuous motion in a two-dimensional
plane. In contrast to previous work, we introduce altruistic punishment after the game. We find punishing only a
few of the cooperator-defector interactions is enough to lead the system to a cooperative state in environments
where otherwise defection would take over the population. This happens even with soft nonsocial punishment
(where both cooperators and defectors punish other players, a behavior observed in many human populations).
For high enough mobilities or temptations to defect, low rates of social punishment can no longer avoid the
breakdown of cooperation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The appearance and maintenance of cooperation is one of
the most important enigmas set out by evolutionary biology
[1]. A problem of utmost importance is that while an individual
can benefit from mutual cooperation, it can often do even better
by exploiting the cooperative efforts of others (and this, in turn,
tends to destroy cooperation) [2]. Evolutionary game theory
has proved to be a major formalization tool in this context,
so different games have been used in many theoretical and
experimental works, and the subject has rapidly jumped to
other domains such as statistical physics and mathematics
[3–7]. In order to model biological systems and human
behavior [1,2], the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game has become
especially well known and studied because in this game the
best strategy for single players becomes the worst one for the
community (see below).
The PD is a game between two individuals, where each one
can choose from whether to cooperate (C) with or to defect
(D) from his opponent. The corresponding payoff matrix of an
interaction between two players is given by(
R S
T P
)
, (1)
where R denotes the payoff each player receives if both
cooperate, S is what a cooperator receives when he is exploited
by a defector (who gains T in this particular interaction), and P
is the payoff for two defectors playing one against another. The
payoffs are ordered as T > R > P  S, so rational players
would always play defection (because it pays more regardless
of the opponent’s decision). But this rationality makes both
players receive only P instead of the reward R > P , which
both players would have accumulated by cooperating, hence
the dilemma. With two individuals destined never to meet
again, the only rational strategy is to defect [2].
The main idea of evolutionary game theory hinges on
individuals playing multiple rounds. This simulates real-world
interactions better than one-shot games and in some settings
leads to the survival of cooperation. In 1981 the Axelrod
computer tournaments [2] analyzed multiple strategies com-
peting in the repeated PD game, with individuals remembering
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their previous interactions. They found defection is not the
only stable strategy. In contrast, some strategies lead to
higher average scores than defection (the most successful
strategy was tit for tat, i.e., simply cooperating on the first
move and then doing whatever the other player did in the
preceding move). These results stimulated a wealth of work
that still continues today [8–10]. In 1992 Nowak and May [11]
introduced the repeated PD game into a simulated population
with its individuals bound to lattice sites of a two-dimensional
spatial array. They found cooperators and defectors both
persist indefinitely (in shifting clusters), without the need to
assume the use of complicated strategies, not even that any
individual remembers previous interactions (each player was
either C or D, and after each round each lattice site was
occupied by the player with the highest payoff among the
previous owner and its neighbors). A huge amount of work has
been undertaken ever since concerning evolutionary games on
graphs [3], exploring many diverse combinations of realistic
network topologies (link dynamics) and strategy update rules
that lead to the survival of cooperation [12–20].
In a recent paper, Meloni et al. explored the effects of
mobility in a population of PD players [21]. Moreover,
the authors introduced an innovative kind of migration. In
spite of the number of recent models that take into account
migration processes in networks [16,20,22–24], Meloni et al.
noted that the continuous motion of individuals (in contrast
to the discontinuous jump of individuals bound to lattice
sites of a grid) was an unexplored situation of practical
relevance. It could also be important in several applications,
e.g., in designing cooperation-based protocols for wireless
devices such as robots [25] and in modeling the dynamics
of interacting human populations with different cultural traits,
e.g., in prehistoric transitions [26]. Therefore, in this paper we
will deal with systems with continuous mobility, as proposed
in Ref. [21]. Such systems exhibit only two stable attractors:
those in which the whole population either cooperates or
defects [21].
In addition to spatial structure, there exist other mechanisms
that provide important aids to cooperators in their fight against
free riders [13]. In this paper, we focus on the effects of
punishing in a population with continuous motion. Punishment
is a negative incentive by which some players (punishers)
impose fines upon some of their coplayers. Punishers usually
pay a cost to punish [27]. Why do then individuals choose
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to punish others [28,29]? Although there is not an ultimate
answer available, it is widely accepted that emotions and moral
sentiments play an important role in human decisions that can
go beyond the maximization of their income [9,10,28,30–34].
Similarly, some humans also reward their cooperative partners
[35]; thus several papers have dealt with positive incentives.
Some recent models have shown, for example, that the appro-
priate dose of the carrot [36] or the convenient combination
with the stick when agents are opportunistic [37] can notably
enhance the triumph of cooperation.
Punishment can be very costly in pairwise interactions;
thus in real life punishment is usually repressed by institutions
holding law and order. But some pairwise interactions with
punishment obviously exist in real life, both in small-scale and
large-scale societies [27]. Still, in agreement with the relative
rarity of pairwise punishment, traditionally, the cooperation-
enhancing effects of punishment have been often analyzed
within the public goods game [9,31,38,39]. Very recently, this
n-person game has provided the scenario where the following
effects have been studied: (i) the strategy D punishes D
(instead of the usual C punishes D) also helps to defeat free
riders [5], (ii) small mutation rates accelerate the spreading of
costly punishment [40], and (iii) spatial structure is respon-
sible for several kinds of coexistence between cooperators,
moralists (cooperators who punish defectors), defectors, and
immoralists (defectors who punish other defectors) [41]. In
this paper we have opted for a simpler setup and considered
pairwise interactions only. Although less commonly used,
two-person games also have been employed in punishment
studies, especially in experimental work. One of the most
representative examples is the ultimatum game [30,42], where
the rejection of an offer is indeed a kind of costly punishment.
Rewarding and punishing human behavior has also been tested
by using sequential PD games (often called gift exchange or
trust games) [43]. In other cases, the payoff matrix of the PD
game has been modified in order to include three types of
players: cooperators, defectors, and punishers [44]. Moreover,
the use of pairwise interactions is also present in models with
incentive strategies [36].
Punishment is often considered a different strategy from
pure cooperation or pure defection [5,40,41]. In this paper,
we do not consider punishers to have a different strategy than
other players. Players are either cooperators or defectors. After
a given interaction, we introduce a probability to punish the
corresponding coplayer. This is a simple way to model that
a certain portion of the interactions is followed by negative
incentives but players do not become obsessed in punishing
every partner they are not comfortable with (since it could be
extremely costly for themselves). Besides social punishment
(C punishes D) we will also analyze what we call nonsocial
punishment (C punishes C, D punishes C, or D punishes D), as
suggested by recent experiments in many human populations
around the world [33].
To summarize, in this paper we introduce social and
nonsocial punishment effects into a model where players
can move continuously in a two-dimensional (2D) world.
Moreover, no punishment strategies are considered; instead,
we deal with probabilities that different interactions between
agents are followed by punishment. In particular, we find that
social punishment helps to maintain cooperation in extreme
environments, even with such a high mobility or temptation
to defect that the system would otherwise be completely
invaded by defectors. We shall also find that the benefits of
social punishment are remarkable, even when some degree of
nonsocial punishment is present in the game.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we present the
main features of the model (including mobility rules, network
of interactions, evolutionary dynamics, social punishment, and
nonsocial punishment). Section III is devoted to explaining
the main effects of considering a nonmobile population in
our model. In Sec. IV we present the general results of our
simulations (phase diagrams showing the dependence on the
relevant parameters of the model). Finally, our concluding
remarks are presented in Sec. V.
II. THE MODEL
In this section we explain the rules that drive the evolution
of the system. We study a population of N = 1000 individuals
living in a square plane of size L. As in Ref. [21], periodic
boundary conditions are imposed at the ends of the square (this
makes the square equivalent to a toroidal surface, thus avoiding
border effects). Simulations are governed by three groups of
rules concerning the motion rules, the network of interactions,
and the evolutionary dynamics. The first two groups of rules we
use here have the same properties of the original model [21],
but the evolutionary dynamics are notably different because we
introduce a probability of punishing the opponent. Simulations
perform sequentially the three sets of rules at each time step t .
In the following three sections, we detail these three types of
rules in the model.
A. Motion rules
At the beginning of each round, every player moves a fixed
distance in a random direction. Hence, the position of a given
individual i (i = 1,2, . . . N) is changed as
xi(t + 1) = xi(t) + vi(t), (2)
where vi(t) = [v cos θi(t),v sin θi(t)] is the speed of the player
i. The direction of the speed is determined randomly as
θi(t + 1) = ηi, (3)
where ηi are N independent random variables chosen at each
time with uniform probability in the interval [−π ; π ].
As in Ref. [21], we consider that the module of the speed v
is constant for all agents, so v is one of the relevant parameters
of the system. At t = 0, both a random position in the square
and a random initial direction of movement is assigned to every
player.
B. Network of interactions
After movement, every player establishes its network of
interactions. An agent i will consider the player j as his or
her neighbor if j is within a certain radius of interaction r .
First, the Euclidean distance dij between players is computed.
Then, if dij < r , we say that i and j are neighbors (and will
interact following the rules in the next section). Without loss
of generality, in all the simulations presented here we have set
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r = 1. The instant network of contacts can be defined by a
graph that links its nodes (individuals) with the current web
of neighbors. Note that such a graph changes at every round
t due to the motion and neighborhood updating of the agents.
The mean degree of the graph is 〈k〉 = ρπr2 = ρπ , where
ρ = N/L2 is the population density (see the work by Meloni
et al. [21] for this and other topological features of the graph).
The dependence of the system properties on the value of ρ
was already analyzed in Ref. [21], Fig. 2 [45]. Therefore, in
this paper we have used the value ρ = 1.30 (as in Ref. [21],
Figs. 1, 3, and 4) [45].
C. Evolutionary dynamics
In this section we summarize the rules regarding the
interaction between agents and their strategy updates.
At each time step t , every individual plays once a PD game
with each of his neighbors. The payoff matrix of the game
is presented in Eq. (1). As usually done in recent studies
(see, e.g., Ref. [21]), we choose R = 1, P = S = 0, and T =
b > 1. The payoffs obtained from the multiple interactions
are accumulated by each player during the round. In the
first round (t = 0), the two possible strategies (C or D) are
equally distributed among the population. Although in other
works each individual can play different strategies against his
multiple opponents, following Ref. [21] here we consider the
simple case where agents can only choose to cooperate with
or to defect from all of his neighbors. This will make it easier
to focus our attention on the effect of punishment.
In contrast to Ref. [21], after every PD interaction is
performed, we consider that each player has the opportunity to
punish his opponent if he is not satisfied with the outcome of
the game. In order to simulate this circumstance, in Sec. II D we
will allow cooperators to punish defectors with probability ps ,
representing social punishment, i.e., the intention to promote a
cooperative society where defectors have a bad reputation. In
Sec. II E, we will extend the model to allow a nonsocial type of
punishment: with probabilitypa , not only will defectors punish
their coplayers (irrespective of their strategy) but cooperators
will also act against other cooperators (representing other
human motives like revenge or preventive strikes [9,33]).
When a punishment action occurs (either in the social or in
the nonsocial case), the punisher pays a cost of 1 unit of
his accumulated payoff in order to reduce the payoff of the
punished player by 3 units (this rate has been used in previous
human experiments, e.g., in Ref. [33], although harder rates
where the punished player loses 4 units instead of 3 have been
also studied [9]).
Finally, after all games have been played and the corre-
sponding punishments have been executed, it is time for the
agents to update their strategies. As in Ref. [21], every agent
will compare his own payoff with that of a randomly chosen
neighbor, and then he will decide whether he keeps playing
the same strategy in the next round or not, as follows. If
individual i and the chosen neighbor j use the same strategy,
nothing happens. In the opposite case, and provided that j has
accumulated higher gains in the current time step, individual i
will adopt the strategy of j with the following probability [21]:
ij = Pj − Pi
max{kj ,ki}b , (4)
(a)
(b)
FIG. 1. Average level of cooperation 〈c〉 (defined as the average
fraction of cooperators) as a function of time (or rounds of the game).
Simulations have been performed for a population of N = 1000
individuals, ρ = 1.30, b = 1.1, and v = 0.2. The solid line depicts
the evolution for a population where social punishment is allowed
(with ps = 0.1). The dash-dotted line shows the evolution of the
same population in a soft nonsocial environment, where ps = 0.1 and
pa = 0.05. The dashed line stands for the case where punishment
is not allowed at all. Finally, the dotted line shows a nonsocial
system where ps = 0.1 and pa = 0.1. Results are averaged for 100
simulations. (b) Average payoff per player as a function of time for the
same cases presented in Fig. (a). The symbols depict the asymptotic
theoretical value for the average payoff. The square is for the social
case, the circle stands for the soft nonsocial system, the triangle is for
the case without punishment, and the rhombus is for the nonsocial
system.
where Pj and Pi are the payoffs accumulated by players j and
i, respectively. In Eq. (4) kj and ki stand for the instantaneous
number of neighbors (i.e., number of players within the circle
of radius r) that players j and i have, respectively. This
updating process is done synchronously for all individuals
in the system. Finally, the payoffs of all individuals are reset
to zero, and the next round can start as explained above.
In our simulations, we have found that the system has
only two stable states, as in the original model without
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punishment [21]. These two attractors are reached when either
cooperation or defection is played by all agents. Moreover,
high values of v or b destroy cooperation when no punishment
is considered, in agreement with Ref. [21].
D. Social punishment
In order to introduce social punishment into our model, we
have allowed cooperators to punish altruistically defectors as
a separate action after the PD interaction. We do not assume
that cooperators always punish their opponents, just that there
is a probability of punishing socially after each cooperator-
against-defector (C-D) interaction. With probability ps the
cooperator will incur a cost of 1 payoff unit to diminish the
defector payoff by 3 units.
Figure 1 sheds some light on the implications of such a
behavior acting directly against freeloaders. Figure 1(a) shows
the evolution of the average level of cooperation 〈c〉, defined as
the average fraction of cooperators, for v = 0.2 and b = 1.1.
The dashed line shows how a population where no punishment
is allowed evolves to a completely defector system. However,
the population can be driven to the maximum cooperation
fraction if some degree of social punishment is present (solid
line). Note that only a 10% of the C-D interactions are followed
by a punishing action (ps = 0.1) in this case. Hence, we
have seen that a relatively low dose of social punishment can
introduce critical advantages for cooperators.
E. Nonsocial punishment
Anger, revenge, and preventive strikes are only a few
motives [33] that can inspire humans to punish, even if this
action plays against the benefits of the community and the
punisher himself. In this section, we will study the effects of
this kind of punishment on the evolution of the population.
We thus consider a type of punishment different from that
explained in Sec. II C. We will call it nonsocial punishment.
Analogously to the social punishing probability ps in-
troduced above, we define the probability of punishing
nonsocially as pa . While ps is the probability that a cooperator
punishes a defector after a C-D interaction, pa applies to any
interaction different from a C-D interaction (see Sec. II C).
This agrees with the definition of antisocial punishment in
the paper of Herrmann et al. [33] that has especially inspired
our work, but in other papers antisocial punishment is strictly
defined as the punishment of cooperators [38,46]. Because
of this, we use the term nonsocial rather than antisocial. The
dotted line in Fig. 1(a) depicts the evolution of the population
in a highly nonsocial environment where ps = pa = 0.1: no
matter which players are engaged, 10% of the interactions are
followed by a punishing action. We can see how in this case
the system favors defection, as this strategy is quickly adopted
by the whole population. Therefore, nonsocial punishment
works directly against the benefits of social punishment, as
it would be expected intuitively [compare with the social case
represented by the solid line in Fig. 1(a)].
Although both social and nonsocial punishment are found
in human communities, the first one is perceived to be more
rational. Imposing a fine on someone who contributes less than
you (social punishment) is easily justified because you find
her or his behavior unfair. In contrast, punishing nonsocially
means that you attack someone that has conducted himself (at
least) as properly as you in the game; hence you do not tolerate
your own behavior. As a result, human players are usually
found to invest higher amounts in social punishment [46,47].
To simulate this effect, we have performed simulations with
ps = pa . Note that this does not mean the total number of
social punishing actions in the system exceeds the nonsocial
one (because the first one is strictly dependent on the number
of C-D interactions). The dash-dotted line in Fig. 1(a) depicts
the evolution for ps = 0.1 and pa = 0.05. In this case, we find
another victory of cooperation. As in the system containing
only social punishers (solid line), the evolution starts with
a soft fall of cooperators, and then (after approximately
100 rounds) the population starts a constant progression to
the maximum cooperation degree. The transient decline of
cooperation is related to the defeat of those cooperators
who were initially placed in a neighborhood with plenty of
defectors. However, aggregates (clusters) of cooperators are
able to survive and flourish in this notably changing (v = 0.2)
environment, provided that the benefits of social punishment
exceed those of nonsocial punishment. Indeed, the evolution
of the nonsocial system [dotted line in Fig. 1(a)] is an example
where these benefits are insufficient to lead the population to
cooperation. Although here we focus on systems with mobile
players, an analog to Fig. 1(a) for v = 0 is included in Sec. III.
It could be sensible to think that the soft nonsocial
case [dash-dotted line in Fig. 1(a)] models a system where
social punishment dominates and, consequently, could be
analogously represented by a system containing only social
punishment. However, this case does not present the same
features of the soft nonsocial system. Indeed, whereas in both
cases the final state is a population composed by cooperators
exclusively, the mean payoff per individual is notably lower in
the nonsocial case. To see this, the mean payoff per individual
in the final state can be predicted as
w = k (fcR − pa − 3pa) , (5)
where fc is the fraction of cooperators in the final stable
state (in our system, either 0 or 1). The mean degree of
the graph in all of our simulations is k = ρπ = 4.08. In
Eq. (5), the mean number of neighbors that an individual has
k is multiplied by the reward of an interaction R provided
that the final state is all cooperators (i.e., fc = 1) minus the
mean costs of the punishments performed or received by the
individual (−pa and −3pa , respectively). Note that the social
punishment probability ps does not appear in Eq. (5) because
C-D interactions are absent in the asymptotic state, in which
all players are either C or D.
Figure 1(b) shows the evolution of the mean payoff per
individual [for the same cases presented in Fig. 1(a)], and the
symbols stand for the final-state values predicted by Eq. (5).
The four curves tend asymptotically to the analytical value
for the final stable state. In all the cases, the mean payoff
shows a rapid decay during the first rounds of the game (every
simulation ends or smooths this decay at a different moment
before 100 rounds). Again, this transient effect corresponds to
the defeat of those cooperators who have been initially placed
in a neighborhood with many defectors. After this transient, the
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surviving cooperators are clustered and resist more efficiently
the exploitation of the defector population. In the no-punishers
and nonsocial cases (dashed and dotted lines, respectively), the
environment is so extreme that even clusters of cooperators
cannot endure the exploitation, and the population continues
its fall toward defection. When the final state is reached, the
mean payoff is 0 in the no-punishers case, as there is no
one that contributes any amount in the game. The situation
is even worse in the nonsocial case, as nonsocial punishment
makes the individuals accumulate negative payoffs. In contrast,
the negative effect of social punishment on the mean payoff
decreases as the number of C-D interactions decays. Hence
the social punishers system (solid line) reaches the maximum
payoff level available when the system is composed only
of cooperators, namely, w = k = 4.08 (because pa = 0 for
social punishment, and we have chosen R = 1 as in, e.g.,
Ref. [21]). Therefore, social punishment is very effective for
promoting cooperation. Finally, the soft nonsocial scenario
allows the survival and maintenance of cooperation [as shown
in Fig. 1(a)], but the average payoff is lower [compare the
dash-dotted line with the solid line in Fig. 1(b)]. Below, we
will present several figures that analyze the relevant parameters
of the model. Although it will not be shown, the computational
and the analytical results of Eq. (5) for the mean payoff agree
as well as in Fig. 1(b) for all the simulations presented in this
paper (when the corresponding steady state is reached).
Some of the major evolutionary characteristics of the
system, detailed above, can be identified by looking a time
series of snapshots for a single simulation. Figure 2 captures
the snapshots at four times for a simulation with v = 0.1,
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
FIG. 2. (Color online) Spatiotemporal evolution of a soft nonsocial population where ps = 0.1 and pa = 0.05. This specific simulation has
been performed for a population of N = 1000 individuals, ρ = 1.30, b = 1.1, and v = 0.1. Green (light gray) dots correspond to cooperator
players, and red (dark gray) dots correspond to defectors. (a) Snapshot at t = 0. The population has been randomly distributed in the
two-dimensional square. The two circles show the radius of interaction of a single cooperator [green (light gray) circle] and a single defector
[red (dark gray) circle]. (b) Snapshot at t = 100. Blue stars correspond to cooperators that punished socially in the last round. (c) Snapshot
at t = 1000. Purple stars (dots) correspond to cooperators (defectors) that punished nonsocially in the last round. (d) The stable all-C state is
reached at t = 5693. Purple stars show the cooperators that still punish their partners when the whole population is cooperator.
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b = 1.1, and the soft nonsocial environment used in Fig. 1
(i.e., ps = 0.1 and pa = 0.05). At t = 0 [Fig. 2(a)], both
cooperator [green (light gray) dots] and defector [red (dark
gray) dots] players are randomly placed in the system, with
the same fraction (〈c〉 = 0.5). In the left part of Fig. 2(a),
we show a green (light gray) circle that represents the radius
of interaction of a specific cooperator player who has been
initially surrounded by several neighbors [during the first
round, he will play the PD game with the eight coplayers who
lie within the green (light gray) circle, with half of them being
cooperators in this case]. In contrast, some other players may
start the game completely isolated, as is the case of the defector
in the center of the red (dark gray) circle [right in Fig. 2(a)].
Because of mobility, the number of connections for each player
will change in time. Thus simulations with no mobility (i.e.,
v = 0) are essentially different from the ones where v > 0.
Indeed, isolated players [like the one in the center of the
red (dark gray) circle in Fig. 2(a)] will never play with other
individuals in a simulation where v = 0, and consequently, the
system will not reach a final all-C or all-D state (see Sec. III
for further details of the case without mobility).
Figure 2(b) shows the state of the system after 100
iterations. At this time, the cooperation fraction has decreased
to 〈c〉  0.35 due to the defeat of those cooperators initially
placed in hostile neighborhoods. As in Fig. 2(a), red (dark gray)
dots correspond to defectors. In Fig. 2(b) we explicitly show
those players who have punished socially at least once in the
last round; hence cooperators have been divided in two types:
green (light gray) dots show the players who have not punished
socially in the last round, and blue stars indicate cooperators
who punished at least one defector neighbor. We can see that
the fraction of cooperators that punishes socially in a given
round [blue stars in Fig. 2(b)] is relatively small. Nevertheless,
we will see how the benefits provided by social punishment
exceed the handicap due to nonsocial punishment in this
system, and the all-C state will be finally reached. In Fig. 2(c)
we can see the state of the system at t = 1000. Here we
explicitly identify the players who used nonsocial punishment
in the last round: purple stars correspond to cooperators who
punished at least one other cooperator, and purple (darkest
gray) dots correspond to defectors who punished at least one
coplayer. In this case, the fraction of cooperation is 〈c〉  0.7,
so clusters of cooperators have spread since t = 100 [compare
to Fig. 2(b)]. Finally, Fig. 2(d) shows the final all-C state
reached after 5693 iterations. In order to explicitly show that
nonsocial punishment still takes place in the game, purple stars
indicate those cooperators who still punish their cooperator
partners. This has a direct effect on the mean payoff attained
by players, as we have shown above [see the discussion of
Fig. 1(a)].
III. THE KEY ROLE OF MOBILITY
In the model we have analyzed, a certain mobility rate of
the players is present in most of the simulations. In the original
model where punishment was not considered [21], an extended
study concerning all the relevant parameters (including the
mobility rate) of the corresponding model was presented.
Roughly summarizing the conclusions by Meloni et al. [21],
the authors noticed cooperation could flourish in their model
FIG. 3. Average level of cooperation 〈c〉 as a function of time for
a population without mobility (v = 0) for N = 1000 individuals, ρ =
1.30, and b = 1.1. The solid line depicts the evolution for a population
where social punishment is allowed (with ps = 0.1). The dash-dotted
line shows the evolution of the same population in a soft nonsocial
environment, where ps = 0.1 and pa = 0.05. The dashed line stands
for the case where punishment is not allowed at all. Finally, the dotted
line shows a nonsocial system where ps = 0.1 and pa = 0.1. Results
are averaged over 100 simulations.
when the parameters b and v were not too high. Moreover,
they pointed out that the mobility led the system to only two
stable states (i.e., all cooperators or all defectors). In contrast,
when v = 0 the graph corresponds to a random geometric
graph [48], so the stabilization of a population containing a
mixture of the two strategies is expected.
The question of how punishment could affect the system
when v = 0 arises. Thus in Fig. 3 we have rerun our
simulations in Fig. 1(a) for a population that does not move
(v = 0). In this case, clusters of cooperators manage to
stabilize and survive in the system if no punishment is applied
(the dashed line in Fig. 3 shows that the average cooperation
in the system is above 20%). However, social punishment
strongly supports cooperators in this immobile system, as
shown by the solid line in Fig. 3 (the cooperation fraction
reaches 90% of the population in this case, where ps = 0.1
and pa = 0). Furthermore, the final outcome is much the same
when the frequency of nonsocial punishment is increased up
to pa = 0.05 (the dash-dotted line depicts this soft nonsocial
scenario, where the stable cooperation fraction is also high).
Nevertheless, the stabilization of this latter case (dash-dotted
line) comes later than in the social case (solid line) and
remains at lower cooperation levels at any time. These results
are no longer reached if we explore a nonsocial system
where ps = pa = 0.1 (dotted line in Fig. 3) since in this case
defection is practically extended to the whole population (the
final cooperation fraction is above 3%).
If we compare the results of Fig. 1(a) (v = 0.2) with those
presented in Fig. 3 (v = 0), we can draw similar conclusions
regarding punishment. In both cases, social punishment helps
cooperation to flourish. But this conclusion breaks down if
sufficiently strong nonsocial punishment is present [in both
Figs. 1(a) and 3, the soft nonsocial case with pa = 0.05 leads to
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generalized cooperation, but the nonsocial case with pa = 0.1
does not]. Furthermore, the comparison of Figs. 1(a) and 3
suggests that the effect of mobility can be very important in
the case of nonsocial punishment. In the case of nonmobile
and nonpunishing populations (dashed line in Fig. 3), the
final stable state permits a coexistence of cooperators and
defectors. The final fraction of cooperators depends on the
value of b. While cooperators are able to survive in clusters
for moderate values of b (as is the case represented by the
dashed line in Fig. 3), only a few isolated cooperators remain
in an almost all-defector population for high values of b (not
shown). In contrast, in the case of mobile populations, the
value of v influences the final outcome for a given value
of b. Here we have shown how clusters of cooperators that
survive in nonmobile populations (dashed line in Fig. 3) are
not able to resist in a population with v = 0.2 [dashed line
in Fig. 1(a)]. In this case the final population is composed
exclusively by defectors. However, the system would have
turned into a full cooperation state if we had chosen a slower
velocity of v = 0.01 for the same value of b = 1.1 (see, for
example, Fig. 1 in Ref. [21]).
In this paper, a huge number of configurations of the
parameters v, b, ps , and pa has been tested. Generally, we
have focused our work on mobile environments with v > 0.
However, the case v = 0 has been simulated and analyzed for
all of the environments presented above (even if not shown in
the figures). In every case, the conclusions from the simulations
with v = 0 were very close to the conclusions from those with
low speeds like v = 0.01 [and sometimes much higher values
like v = 0.2, such as those presented above by comparing
Figs. 1(a) and 3]. In Figs. 4, 5, and 6 we have taken care that
the minimum speed presented does not sensibly differ from
the results obtained for v = 0.
IV. GENERAL RESULTS
This section is devoted to exploring the limits of
punishment-enhanced cooperation. Hence, we will extend the
results in order to analyze all of the relevant parameters of the
model.
In addition to N and ρ (see Sec. II B), the model in Ref. [21]
has two relevant parameters, namely, the mobility rate v and
the temptation to defect b. Here we have extended that model
to include punishment, so we will analyze the role of the
parameters ps and pa in addition to v and b.
Figure 4 shows a phase diagram where the effects of the
mobility v and the temptation to defect b are explored (for the
same sets of values for ps and pa as in Fig. 1). The dashed
line corresponds to the case where punishment is not present
(i.e., ps = pa = 0). The region where simulations end up with
a population of all cooperators falls below the dashed line
(whereas an all-D state is found above the dashed line). This
limit agrees well with the results presented in Ref. [21]. The
solid line in Fig. 4 indicates the frontier between cooperation
and defection when social punishment is introduced with
probability ps = 0.1. Comparing the dashed line with the
solid line, it follows that social punishment clearly expands
the parameter region where cooperation is reached. When no
punishment is allowed in the game (dashed line), the maximum
temptation to defect that cooperation can endure is slightly
FIG. 4. Phase diagrams for different versions of punishment as
a function of v and b. Results have been obtained for a population
of N = 1000 individuals, with ρ = 1.30. The solid line depicts the
phase transition for a population where social punishment is allowed
(with ps = 0.1). The dash-dotted line corresponds to the case of a soft
nonsocial environment, where ps = 0.1 and pa = 0.05. The dashed
line stands for the phase transition where punishment is not allowed at
all. Finally, the dotted line corresponds to a nonsocial system where
ps = 0.1 and pa = 0.1. In the inset, the lines depict the transition
phases for the following cases: the solid line corresponds to ps = 0.3,
the dash-dotted line corresponds to ps = 0.3 and pa = 0.1, and the
dashed line corresponds to the case ps = pa = 0. No full cooperation
phase was found for the nonsocial case where ps = pa = 0.3.
FIG. 5. Phase diagrams for different mobility rates as a function
of ps and pa in the specific case with b = 1.5. Results have been
obtained for a population of N = 1000 individuals, with ρ = 1.30.
The solid line depicts the phase transition when the mobility of the
agents is v = 0.01, the dashed line stands for the case v = 0.2, the
dotted line is for v = 0.6, and the dash-dotted line represents the case
of v = 0.8.
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FIG. 6. Phase diagrams for several temptation to defect values
as a function of ps and pa and v = 0.1. Results have been obtained
for a population of N = 1000 individuals, with ρ = 1.30. The solid
line depicts the phase transition when the temptation to defect is
b = 1.1, the dashed line stands for the case b = 1.5, and the dotted
line presents the case b = 2.0.
under the value b = 1.2. In contrast, when social punishment
is introduced (solid line), the transition from cooperation to
defection occurs at a maximum b value of 1.45. These values
of b remain approximately independent of the mobility rate
when v < 0.05 (see Fig. 4). This indicates that the clustering of
cooperators is easily attainable below v  0.05. Nevertheless,
Fig. 4 shows that at higher speeds (v > 0.05) the parameter
region where cooperation is available becomes smaller: both
solid and dashed lines present a gradual decay (the higher
the value of v is, the lower the temptation to defect b that
cooperation can resist is). This is because agglomerations of
cooperators are hard to maintain in highly mobile systems.
Without punishment (dashed line), the system cannot achieve
the full cooperation regime when v  0.2 (independently of
the value of b), whereas in the social environment (solid line)
full cooperation is possible up to v ≈ 0.7.
Figure 4 also shows the transition from full cooperation
to full defection for a soft nonsocial environment (dash-
dotted line, i.e., pa = 0.05 in addition to ps = 0.1). For this
parametrization, the cooperative region covers a higher area
of v and b than in the case without punishment (dashed line)
but smaller than in the social environment (solid line). The last
curve shown in Fig. 4 corresponds to a nonsocial environment
where ps = pa = 0.1 (dotted line). In this case, nonsocial
punishment plays an important role against cooperators: the
majority of the parameter range explored is dominated by
defection, whereas cooperation only manages to survive at
very low values of v and b (v < 0.03 and b = 1.05).
The curves in Fig. 4 clearly show that the system is sensitive
to the addition of both social and nonsocial punishment. Thus
we now analyze what values of ps and pa drive the population
to cooperation. Before an in-depth analysis, in the inset of
Fig. 4 we consider the case in which social punishment is as
frequent as ps = 0.3 and nonsocial punishment is not allowed
(full line). Then cooperation wins for most values of b if the
mobility is not high (v < 0.1). When increasing the mobility,
the cooperative state displays its usual decay to more modest
values of b. However, under a critical value of the temptation to
defect (in this specific case for b < 1.45) cooperation prevails
at any speed in the range v ∈ [0.1], indicating that the positive
effects of such extended social punishment (ps = 0.3) sustain
cooperation even when the system is close to a well-mixed
population. This behavior remains qualitatively the same if a
moderate degree of nonsocial punishment is introduced in the
system (dash-dotted line in the inset of Fig. 4, i.e., pa = 0.1
in addition to ps = 0.3). In this latter situation the range of
b cooperation can endure is always below the case where
only social punishment is present (solid line in Fig. 4, inset).
For comparison, we have also included the system without
punishment (dashed line in Fig 4, inset). Finally, the nonsocial
environment ps = pa = 0.3 has also been explored, but no
full cooperation phase has been found in the parameter ranges
explored. This indicates that increasing the value of pa leads to
a harsher effect against cooperation (compare to the case ps =
pa = 0.1 in Fig. 4 where a small cooperative region is found).
Summarizing, we have shown in Fig. 4 that social punishment
enhances notably the v-b region available for the cooperative
phase. Furthermore, social punishment produce benefits for
cooperation even if some degree of nonsocial punishment is
considered. However, when nonsocial punishment becomes
substantially frequent, it leads to the triumph of freeloaders.
In order to further analyze the role of ps and pa , Fig. 5
shows their effect on the transition between cooperative and
defective regimes (for b = 1.5). The solid line in Fig. 5
shows computational results for a mobility rate v = 0.01.
Note that cooperation is not possible below a critical social
punishment probability (ps  0.15). For ps > 0.15, the all-
C stable state is reached provided that pa takes moderate
values (full cooperation is reached if ps > pa). It follows
that the more extended the nonsocial punishment is in the
system, the more frequent the social punishment has to be in
order to sustain cooperation. There is an interesting region
(0.15 < ps < 0.4) where social punishment seems to resist
better the presence of nonsocial punishment. The dashed line
depicts the case v = 0.2, where in response to the higher
mobility, the system is more sensible to nonsocial punishment
in the region 0.15 < ps < 0.4. The dotted line corresponds
to a substantially higher mobility, v = 0.6. Now the system
needs more frequent social punishment to make cooperation
successful. Indeed, whereas for v < 0.2 cooperation is found at
ps  0.15 (solid and dashed lines), for v = 0.6 no cooperation
phase exists below ps = 0.25 (dotted line). Furthermore, there
is again a region where social punishment is more efficient
against nonsocial punishment (dotted line, 0.25 < ps < 0.5).
Finally, the dash-dotted line in Fig. 5 displays a highly mobile
system (v = 0.8), which is closer to a well-mixed population
than the case v = 0.6 (dotted line). Under very high mobility,
the enhanced efficiency of social punishment in the region
0.25 <ps < 0.5 disappears, and cooperation is not sustainable
below more frequent social punishment (ps = 0.35).
Although the solid line in Fig. 5 depicts the phase transition
for the case v = 0.01, we have also performed simulations for
several values in the range v ∈ [0,0.01], and the corresponding
phase transitions are independent of v in this range. On the
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other hand, the outcome of simulations performed for v > 0.8
agree well with the case v = 0.8.
Whereas in Fig. 5 we have shown the dependence of the
phase transitions on the parameters ps and pa for different
mobilities and a fixed value of b = 1.5, in Fig. 6 we vary the
temptation to defect b for a fixed value of v (v = 0.1). The
dashed line in Fig. 6 (b = 1.5, as in Fig. 5) shows similar
behavior to the solid line in Fig. 5 (v = 0.01), including a
region where social punishment is especially effective (0.15 <
ps < 0.30). On the other hand, the solid line in Fig. 6 represents
a much more social environment since the temptation to
defect is now b = 1.1 (cooperation is available even in the
absence of punishment, ps = pa = 0). The dotted line in Fig. 6
corresponds to a high temptation to defect (b = 2). In this
case, the region available for cooperation is limited to high
values of social punishment (cooperation is not sustainable
for ps < 0.45), similar to what happens under high mobility
(dash-dotted line in Fig. 5).
In Figs. 5 and 6, we have shown that for very high values
of v or b, defection is the dominant strategy, and cooperation
is only possible for extreme social punishment frequencies
(in contrast, for low values of v and b cooperation is more
sustainable). This extends the results by Meloni et al. [21] to
systems under social and nonsocial punishment, as observed
in many human populations [33]. Moreover, when v and b take
moderate values, low doses of social punishment are especially
effective in counteracting the effects of nonsocial punishment.
This is an important result because it means that players do
not need to be rude punishers in order to promote cooperation;
thus in the fight against defection, lower mean expenditures
on altruistic punishment are necessary.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have built a model that introduces altruistic punishment
options in a population with mobile players of the PD game.
Players move continuously in a two-dimensional world, a case
of practical relevance with potential applications, such as the
design of cooperation-based protocols for communication [25]
and the modelization of transitions in human prehistory [26].
In our model, punishment is not a strategy but an action that
players may perform against their partners with a certain
probability after each round of the game. We have found
that punishing after only 10% of the cooperator-defector
interactions is enough to lead the system to a world of
cooperation, in some environments where otherwise defection
would take over the population. Furthermore, this conclusion
holds even if some degree of nonsocial punishment (an action
that is commonly performed by human players) is present in
the system. Our analytical predictions for the mean payoff of
the final state agree with simulations. We have also found that,
although soft nonsocial punishment can lead to a cooperative
state, it yields lower payoffs than social punishment.
We have extensively analyzed the role of the relevant model
parameters: the mobility of the players v, the temptation to de-
fect b, the social punishment probability ps , and the nonsocial
onepa . The phase diagrams have shown that social punishment
increases the values of v and b where cooperation is available.
We have found that this result resists some degree of nonsocial
punishment. Moreover, the full-cooperation region is sensible
to the increment of pa. Finally, we have shown that the benefits
of social punishment are limited, and defection asymptotically
prevails in harsh environments for cooperation (represented
here by high mobilities, high temptation to defect values, and
extended practices of nonsocial punishment).
The model in this paper takes into account simple mobility
rules and strategies. Additional degrees of complexity could
be added in order to closely study human abilities to face
defector (or cooperator) neighbors. For example, success-
driven migration could be studied (this has been recently
proposed in square lattices [16] but not yet for continuous
motion).
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